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INTRODUCTION  
The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in two cases that impli-
cate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: Montejo v. Louisiana1 and Kan-
sas v. Ventris.2  Although each case presented a relatively narrow Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel issue, the subtext of both oral arguments sug-
gests that the Court is rethinking the scope of the Sixth Amendment core 
values themselves.  Since holding that the Fifth Amendment provides for a 
right to counsel in custodial interrogations, the Court has conflated the Fifth 
Amendment3 prophylactic rule with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.4  
The resulting jurisprudential disorder has prompted several Justices to con-
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1
  Montejo v. Louisiana, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 30 (2008) (No. 07-1529) (argued Jan. 13, 2009) 
(link), decision below at State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La. 2008).  The question presented in Mon-
tejo is: ―When an indigent defendant‘s right to counsel has attached and counsel has been appointed, 
must the defendant take additional affirmative steps to ‗accept‘ the appointment in order to secure the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation without counsel 
present?‖  Montejo, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01529sp.pdf (link). 
2
  Kansas v. Ventris, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 29 (2008) (No. 07-1356) (argued Jan. 21, 2009) (link), 
decision below at State v. Ventris, 176 P.3d 920 (Kan. 2008).  The question presented in Ventris is: 
―Whether a criminal defendant‘s ‗voluntary statement obtained in the absence of a knowing and volunta-
ry waiver of the [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel,‘ Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 354 (1990), is 
admissible for impeachment purposes . . . ?‖  Ventris, No. 07-1356 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01356qp.pdf (link).  
3
  The Fifth Amendment provides that ―[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself . . . .‖  U.S. CONST. amend V (link). 
4
  The Sixth Amendment includes the guarantee that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.‖  U.S. CONST. amend VI (link).  
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rogations into the Fifth Amendment Miranda5 framework.6  This short essay 
explains why the Court should resist the temptation to do so. 
I. CONFUSING THE ISSUE: THE COURT‘S CONFLATION OF THE FIFTH 
AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS 
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel recognized in Miranda is a 
prophylactic guarantee designed to protect an individual‘s right against 
―compelled self-incrimination.‖7  The Miranda/Edwards8 rule requires the 
police to inform an individual in custody that she has the right to an attor-
ney and the right to remain silent.  It further provides that once an individu-
al asks for counsel during a custodial interrogation, the police should not 
ask any more questions.  In these ways, the Miranda/Edwards rule attempts 
to stop individuals from unwittingly waiving their Fifth Amendment 
rights—its goal is not only to prevent self-incrimination, but also to ensure 
the voluntariness of any self-incriminating statements.  The rule is a judge-
made shield positing that counsel at the interrogation stage is necessary to 
protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.9 
The Fifth Amendment Miranda/Edwards rule first infected the Court‘s 
Sixth Amendment analysis in Michigan v. Jackson.10  In Jackson, the Su-
preme Court held that once a defendant asserts her Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding, any waiver of that right 
at a subsequent police-initiated interrogation is invalid.11  Jackson exempli-
fies the confusion surrounding the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.12  On one 





  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (link). 
6
  Although the Miranda Rule has been described as ―prophylactic,‖ the Court has recognized that it 
is in fact a constitutional rule.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (―Miranda, be-
ing a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress . . . .‖). 
7
  Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 638 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (link). 
8
  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that once an accused expresses his desire to 
deal with the police only through counsel, he may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel 
has been made available to him, unless the accused has himself initiated further communication) (link). 
9
  See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
444 (1974)) (―Miranda [rights] therefore are ‗not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but 
[are] instead measures to insure that the [suspect‘s] right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] pro-
tected.‘‖) (link). 
10
  475 U.S. 625 (majority opinion) (link). 
11
  Id. at 636.   
12
  Justice Rehnquist explained in his Jackson dissent that the majority‘s logic perplexed him.  See 
id. at 637 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―The Court‘s decision today rests on the following deceptively 
simple line of reasoning: Edwards v. Arizona . . . created a bright-line rule to protect a defendant‘s Fifth 
Amendment rights; Sixth Amendment rights are even more important than Fifth Amendment rights; 
therefore, we must also apply the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment.  The Court prefers this neat 
syllogism to an effort to discuss or answer the only relevant question: Does the Edwards rule make 
sense in the context of the Sixth Amendment?  I think it does not, and I therefore dissent from the 
Court‘s unjustified extension of the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment.‖).  
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decision,13 where the Court reaffirmed that ―The Fifth Amendment right 
identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial 
interrogation.‖14  On the other hand, it recognized that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel is broader than the Fifth Amendment prophylactic 
rule: ―[T]he reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled 
prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he 
has been formally charged with an offense than before.‖15  
Fifteen years later, in Texas v. Cobb,16 Justice Kennedy, joined by Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, authored a concurring opinion that questioned ―the 
underlying theory of Jackson.‖17  Kennedy conveyed the particular worry 
that Jackson rendered all statements made at a —post-attachment) police-
initiated interrogation inadmissible, even where the defendant‘s cooperation 
with police was voluntary.18  This attention to the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, and the voluntariness of a defendant‘s post-
attachment statement, reemerged a few weeks ago at the oral argument in 
Montejo v. Louisiana.19  
In Montejo, the Court confronted a Louisiana Supreme Court decision 
holding that a defendant must affirmatively —and vocally) accept appoint-
ment of counsel in order to validly invoke the right to counsel under Jack-
son.20  The Justices‘ barrage of questions at the argument indicated to Court 
observers that ―the Court might want to overturn Jackson.‖21  In fact, nearly 
three months after the Court heard argument, it asked the parties to brief 
that exact question: should the Court overrule Jackson?22  At argument, sev-





  See id. at 629 (majority opinion) (drawing on the framework set forth in Edwards).   
14
  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981) (link). 
15
  Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631 (link).   
16
  532 U.S. 162 (2001) (link). 
17
  Id. at 174 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
18
  Id. at 175 (―The parallel rule announced in Jackson . . . supersedes the suspect‘s voluntary choice 
to speak with investigators.‖). 
19
  See Posting of Brian Sagona to SCOTUSblog, Argument Recap: Montejo v. Louisiana, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/argument-recap-montejo-v-louisiana (Jan. 14, 2009, 17:45 EST) (―The 
argument opened with both Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice expressing concerns that Jackson might 
be overly broad, preventing a defendant from voluntarily waiving his Sixth Amendment rights once he 
or she obtained counsel.‖) (link). 
20
  State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260–61 (La. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Montejo v. Loui-
siana, 128 S. Ct. 30 (2008) (No. 07-1529). 
21
  Posting of Brian Sagona, supra  note 19; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Montejo, No. 07-
1529 (U.S. argued Jan. 13, 2009) (Alito, J.), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1529.pdf (―Mr. Verrilli, do 
you think that Michigan v. Jackson is immune from being reexamined at this point?‖) (link). 
22
  Montejo, No. 07-1529, 2009 WL 793514 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2009) (mem.) (order in pending case), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/montejo-order-3-27-09.pdf 
(link).  
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tion of coercion or involuntariness.23  However, as Justice Souter observed, 
the defendant Montejo understands Jackson to be broader than merely a 
―no-coercion rule.‖24  Indeed, there is more at stake in these cases.  
A few days after the argument in Montejo, the petitioner in Kansas v. 
Ventris25 argued that ―any voluntary statement by [a] defendant should be 
admissible for impeachment . . . even if the statement was made in the ab-
sence of counsel.‖26  The Justices again pressed on the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment.  Justice Scalia suggested that the Court‘s holding might turn 
on when the Sixth Amendment violation occurseither it occurs at the time 
the statement is taken or at the time the statement is introduced at trial.27  
The temporal question is critical because the Court‘s answer will signal 
whether it supports a broad or narrow understanding of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.28  If, as we argue below, the Sixth Amendment viola-
tion occurs when the State approaches a post-attachment accused without 
her counsel present, then the Jackson rule is not prophylactic but instead de-
lineates the scope of the Sixth‘s Amendment‘s core values. 
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL AND UNTANGLING IT FROM THE FIFTH AMENDMENT MIRANDA 
RIGHT 
If the Sixth Amendment merely protects against involuntary or com-
pelled statements, then the move toward a voluntariness rule would make 
senseeven the defendant Ventris concedes that the statement he gave 
while in custody was not coerced.29  But the Sixth Amendment also protects 
the adversarial process; thus, a police officer‘s surreptitious recording of a 





  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Montejo, No. 07-1529 (Scalia, J.) (―I thought that the 
rationale of Jackson was that the confession is simply deemed to be coerced if the defendant has ex-
pressed . . . his desire to have counsel present or even to be represented by counsel.‖); id. at 24 (Scalia, 
J.) (―You have to assume that his voluntary relinquishment of [his Sixth Amendment right] is somehow 
coerced. . . .  You can‘t get around the coercion aspect of . . . this matter.‖); id. at 25 (Roberts, C.J.) 
(―[T]here are protections against the actual coercion, which it seems to me you‘re arguing.  As I unders-
tood Justice Scalia‘s question, he says: Don‘t you have to assume that there is coercion even in the mild-
est case, not the most extreme one, but the mildest one?‖) (link). 
24
  Id. at 23 (Souter, J.).  
25
  Kansas v. Ventris, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 29 (2008) (No. 07-1356) (argued Jan. 21, 2009).   
26
  Posting of Eliza Presson to SCOTUSblog, Oral Argument Recap: Kansas v. Ventris, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/oral-argument-recap-kansas-v-ventris/#more-8611 (Jan. 30, 2009, 11:15 
EST) (link). 
27
  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ventris, No. 07-1356 (U.S. argued Jan. 21, 2009) (Scalia, 
J.), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1356.pdf 
(―When does . . . the Sixth Amendment violation occur?‖) (link); id. at 22 (Scalia, J.) (―So you say that . 
. . the Sixth Amendment violation occurs before trial?‖).  
28
  If the Court views the Sixth Amendment right to counsel expansively, it will find a violation at 
the time the statement is taken, rather than when the statement is introduced at trial.   
29
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Ventris, No. 07-1356 (statement of attorney for Respondent) 
(conceding that ―there is no claim that the statement was involuntary‖) (link).   
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pretrial deposition . . . [where] one side isn‘t represented.‖30  In that in-
stance, any use of such statement, even if limited to rebuttal purposes, in-
volves the court in the constitutional transgression.31  
Although it would be much easier for the government to secure convic-
tions if voluntariness became the sole harbinger of admissibility, the Consti-
tution‘s Framers specifically provided for the right to counsel when ―‗the 
government has committed itself to prosecute‘‖ and a defendant ―‗finds 
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society.‘‖32  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is more than just a ―trial right,‖ and that it provides protection at all 
critical stages of a prosecution.33  There are three reasons the Court should 
resist the temptation to equate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and 
why it should not permit admission of all ―voluntary‖ statements made dur-
ing interrogation: —1) the Sixth Amendment‘s textual commitment to the 
right to counsel supports categorical protections throughout all stages of 
prosecution; —2) the goal of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
broader than the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and —
3) policy considerations suggest different results in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment contexts. 
According to the Constitution, ―In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.‖34  Thus, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a textually mandated categorical re-
quirement.35  By contrast, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination centers on the concept of state coercion and compulsion: ―No 
person shall . . . be compelled . . . to be a witness against himself . . . .‖36  
Unlike the Sixth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment explicitly imports an 





  Id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J.). 
31
  See id. at 21–22 (Scalia, J.).  In attempting to ascertain whether the use of statements made in ab-
sence of counsel for impeachment purposes is permissible under the Sixth Amendment, Justice Scalia 
said, ―I am still a little hung up onon whether we would be allowing a constitutional violation. . . .  
[The Sixth Amendment‘s] root purpose is that counsel is guaranteed at trial.  And here we‘re saying it‘s 
okay not to have counsel at trial so long as it‘s refuting a lie by the defendant.‖ 
32
  Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (2008) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)). 
33
  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (recognizing defendants‘ right to counsel ―during 
perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . that is to say, from the time of their arraignment 
until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are] 
vitally important . . . .‖) (link). 
34
  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added) (link). 
35
  See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1493, 1528–30 (2006) (link). 
36
  U.S. CONST. amend V  (emphasis added) (link). 
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long-standing rules of constitutional interpretation)37 that this distinction is a 
purposeful one.   
Assistance of counsel preserves the integrity of the criminal justice 
system and safeguards the defendant‘s right to a fair trial38 because the ef-
fective assistance of a lawyer can diminish the disparities in strength and 
bargaining power between the powerful state and the simple accused.  The 
structural disparities that exist in the post-attachment/pretrial time gap can 
eviscerate the possibility of a fair trial even before attorneys make opening 
statements.  Accordingly, once the right to counsel attaches,39 the guiding 
hand of counsel must protect the accused at every critical stage of the pros-
ecution.40 
Instrumentally, the distinct purposes of counsel across the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments is best illustrated by framing the Fifth Amendment right 
as the right to ―counsel as protector,‖ and the Sixth Amendment right as the 
right to ―counsel as strategist.‖  In the Fifth Amendment context, the right 
to counsel gives the suspect an opportunity to defend against attempts by 
the state to bully and badger the suspect into confessing.  In the Sixth 
Amendment context, however, counsel must weigh the costs and benefits of 
each move the defendant makesat every critical stageand she must stra-
tegically manage the flow of information between the state and the ac-
cused.41  Of course, the role of counsel as strategist sometimes encompasses 
the protector role.  But preventing self-incrimination is not the Sixth 
Amendment right‘s main purpose.  Rather, its primary purpose is to level 
the playing field and provide information parity throughout the adversarial 
process. 
The distinction between the state‘s role during the investigative process 
and its role at the prosecutorial stage further bolsters the case to construe 





  See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570–71 (1840) (―In expounding the Consti-
tution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evi-
dent from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.‖) (link).   
38
  As U.S. Assistant Solicitor General Saharsky, arguing in support of the Petitioner, observed: ―The 
purpose of the right to counsel is to provide an adversary process to ensure that the defendant gets a fair 
trial.‖  Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Kansas v. Ventris, No. 07-1356 (U.S. argued Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1356.pdf (link).  
39
  The time of attachment is critical; ―[o]nly when the state formally commits to prosecution do the 
dangers posed by adversarial inequalityoverreaching, overpowering, deception, and the likearise.‖ 
James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA 
L. REV. 975, 984 (1986). 
40
  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (stating that ―the accused is guaranteed that 
he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution . . . where counsel‘s absence 
might derogate from the accused‘s right to a fair trial.‖) (link). 
41
  For example, how a defendant should cooperate with the state might depend on what the accused 
can bargain for in return.  At the very least, the accused must know which portion of the information she 
holds might later be used to make her look guilty or to undermine the defense theory at trial.  These con-
siderations arise precisely because plea-bargaining has become the dominant way to resolve criminal 
cases. 
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pre-attachment interrogation context, the state might interrogate numerous 
suspects in order to determine who committed a crime.  Given that only one 
person —or a finite number of people that is often less than the number of 
people under suspicion) committed the crime, it follows that only one per-
son under investigation holds relevant self-incriminating information.  The 
right against self-incrimination protected in the Fifth Amendment is there-
fore not triggered in every interrogation.42  Post-indictment, on the other 
hand, the state takes a concrete adversarial position against one person —or 
finite group), and marshals its vast resources in its effort to convict.  The 
defendant‘s counsel must be prepared to be a medium between the accused 
and the state, and to assure the latter‘s best position.43  If the state could ex-
ploit its structural advantages44 to pressure or manipulate the defendant into 
acting against his best interest during the prosecutorial stage —and outside 
the presence of counsel), the right to a fair trial would mean nothing.  
Allocating the burden of requesting a lawyer to the accused in the pre-
attachment interrogation context therefore makes good sense: the underly-
ing right against compulsory self-incrimination does not automatically ap-
ply, and the state‘s crime-solving interest is at its peak.  Post-attachment, 
however, requiring the defendant to affirmatively request counsel under-
mines core Sixth Amendment values.  When the state approaches the post-
attachment accused, its attempt to persuade him to make any decision with-
out an attorney —including his decision to waive the right to counsel) nec-
essarily undercuts his right to depend on counsel to guide him through 
every decision important to his defense.  Accordingly, the Fifth Amend-
ment approach does not reflect the different role that counsel plays in the 
Sixth Amendment context. 
CONCLUSION 
In Jackson, the Court did not fully emphasize the unique values ani-
mating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The perceived reliance on 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in that opinion has led some members of 
the Court to suggest that Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections during in-
terrogation are the same, and that both should be waivable outside the pres-
ence of counsel.  In reevaluating its holding in Jackson, however, the Court 





  Moreover, the state has a more urgent interest in pre-attachment than post-attachment interroga-
tion.  Once enough evidence exists to narrow the investigative funnel to the prosecution of a single per-
son, the state‘s interest substantively changes.  Post-attachment confessions serve a proof-enhancing, 
rather than crime-solving, function. 
43
  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (stating that the ―Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
accused . . . the right to rely on counsel as a ‗medium‘ between him and the State‖) (link). 
44
  The state has round-the-clock access to the defendant as well as vastly superior resources. 
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Amendment cases.  Those Justices who want police-initiated interrogations 
to be valid whenever police obtain a waiver threaten to do just that.45   
Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in Cobb underscored that the majority 
rule in Jackson eliminated the defendant‘s ―choice to speak with investiga-
tors after a Miranda warning.‖46  And the notion that all voluntary state-
ments should be admissible is, initially, an appealing onean admissibility 
rule based on voluntariness speaks to a fundamental respect for agency and 
personal autonomy.  Practically, however, problems with such a rule would 
abound.  First, nothing in the Jackson rule prevents a defendant from elect-
ing to initiate communication with the police.  More fundamentally, once 
―‗the government has committed itself to prosecute‘‖ and the ―‗defendant 
finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, [] 
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law,‘‖47 
one must wonder how much autonomy an unrepresented defendant can pos-
sibly enjoy.  There may be legitimate reasons to admit into evidence volun-
tary statements made by the defendant before the Sixth Amendment right 
attachesthe state is seeking to solve a crime, the constitutional values at 
stake are limited —to the right against self-incrimination), and the state has 
not yet committed itself to depriving the individual of life, liberty, or prop-
erty.  But these reasons do not apply to voluntary statements made after the 
state has committed itself to prosecution. 
The Court should reject application of the voluntariness test to the 
Sixth Amendment, and be wary of the underlying autonomy rationale driv-
ing its consideration.  Instead, the Court should recognize a critical differ-
ence between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: unlike the Fifth 
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment‘s text categorically guarantees the right 
to counsel, and therefore the right is not constrained by an assessment of 
voluntariness.  This difference counsels an alternative approach to Jack-
son‘s inevitable reexamination: rather than curtail the right to counsel by 
making it easier to waive, the Court should fulfill the right‘s guarantee by 
eschewing invocation requirements and disallowing the introduction of 
statements for impeachment purposes.  The Court should articulate a ratio-
nale that severs the jurisprudence from its reliance on the Fifth Amendment 
concerns with voluntariness, and that restores an independent constitutional 





  These Justices support the claim made in Kennedy‘s Cobb concurrence that ―[t]here is little justi-
fication for not applying the same [Fifth Amendment] course of reasoning with equal force to the court-
made preventative rule announced in Jackson; for Jackson, after all, was a wholesale importation of the 
Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.‖  Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (link).   
46
   Id. at 176.   
47
  Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (2008) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)).   
